First Impressions: Books looked at quickly

David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism

He makes the point in his introduction that, whatever else there is to say about the spread of democracy, “habit and custom” were generally against it. “even in Rhode Island where, as John Adams wrote, ‘there has been no Clergy, no Church, and I had almost said no State, and some People say no religion, there has been a constant respect for certain old Families.’” (xiii)

Contains appendices with cast of characters by state, as well as political affiliations of early republic newspapers.


Robert Darnton, The Kiss of Lamourette

Apparently a collection of essays he had laying around. I shouldn’t have read “Publishing: A Survival Strategy for Academic Authors” first. It was so annoying and Bill-Brysonesque that it left everything else feeling a little too slimy with conceit.


Henry F. May, The Enlightenment in America

Is this a standard intellectual history? Not my cup of tea…



John Higham and Paul K. Conkin, New Directions in American Intellectual History

This is a series of essays from 1979, when intellectual history was “in the wilderness.” Two of the major assumptions that had come under attack: that societies tend to be integrated (to have a meaningful “national character” at all), and that a shared culture maintains that integration. If these are not true, then intellectual histories are possible for competing groups. And, most interesting for me, between “intellectuals” and “non-intellectuals.” (Is calling it
mentalities sometimes a subtle slam at the subject of study, who we don’t think is “up to” having an intellectual position? This may be more than just a question of semantics)

Is there a question of agency? Do we assume that “intellectuals” choose their beliefs (world-view, attitude towards change, causality, etc.)? And that regular people don’t. Is determinism a feature of sociology? New social history? Dialectical materialism? And – is it
not present in intellectual history?

“Some historians concentrate on clearly articulated beliefs that are amenable to formal exegesis. Others are strongly drawn to examining the less refined level of consciousness the French have taught us to call collective mentalities.” Is this distinction what he thinks it is? Isn’t there a big chunk of underwater iceberg, holding up those “clearly articulated beliefs?” Is it really that easy to distinguish them? Isn’t this why intellectual historians inevitably get around to flirting with psychology?

The authors mention the fashion (at the Wingspread Conference) for studying communities and their “paradigmatic” assumptions (they mention Kuhn and Haskell). This seems like it will be helpful, where it’s possible to identify group membership. Everyone belongs to multiple groups. How does religious affiliation (Catholic vs. Protestant) influence labor activism in early 20
th c. New England? How does relative group ranking (“family first” among immigrant Italians) influence participation and level of commitment in other groups? How does overall skepticism (or irony) affect acceptance of group paradigms? (J. Guglielmo’s Italian immigrant women)

Laurence Veysey quotes Charles Peirce: “It is the belief men
betray and not that which they parade which has to be studied.” Okay, I guess I need to read at least that article…


Paul A. Varg, America, From Client State to World Power

Vague.