Mr. Madison's War
07/12/2010 18:17
J.C.A. Stagg
Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830
1983
Stagg admits that the dominant feature of almost all literature” on the War of 1812 “has been its emphasis on the sheer ineptitude of the American war effort.” But even so, “to stress ineptitude as the theme of the War of 1812...is to neglect an important, albeit obvious, point about its history--which is that no administration could have actually intended what happened to have occurred.” (x) The question is, was there a realistic plan behind Madison’s policy, or was he too a source of incompetence? “The incompetence that seemed all-pervasive during the war years was more than simply the failings of so many individuals; rather it was symptomatic of political and administrative problems deeply rooted in the government of American society. Yet the founding fathers, including Madison himself, had justified the introduction of a new constitution in 1789 very much on the grounds that it would provide the United States with a more efficient system of government and prevent a recurrence of the disorder that had characterized the War for Independence.” (xi) This is an interesting point, because it suggests that the founders were particularly concerned about facilitating a united military, in expectation of future wars with Britain. And because it suggests a lack of concern with what the American people actually wanted, both in the minds of the founders and of Professor Stagg.
At the end of his introduction, Stagg also seems to admit that the war didn’t really resolve anything. Nor did “the sudden rise of Anglo-American ‘friendship’ after 1815.” (xii) The real change in British-American relations was brought about by neither Britons nor Americans, but by a change in the global balance of power created by “the emancipation of Latin America.” So in that sense, a study of politics and American foreign policy through 1830 that doesn’t say another word about Spanish American independence, seems fatally myopic.
Madison’s decision for war is hard to see as sensible. When it declared war on Great Britain, the U.S. “could command little more than six thousand regular troops and a naval force consisting of sixteen vessels of all sizes.” In contrast, the British controlled the seas with “six hundred vessels in active service while also supporting a regular army at home and abroad that totaled nearly one quarter of a million men.” (3) Stagg says Madison believed America could easily take a large part of Canada, and that this would bring Britain to the negotiating table. But in 1812 his Jeffersonian political allies seem to have been on the same page: “The best-known statement of American optimism about the ease of seizing Canada was Thomas Jefferson’s claim that ‘the acquisition of Canada...as far as the neighborhood of Quebec will be a mere matter of marching.’” (note 8, 5) The critical issue was denying Britain access to raw materials it needed in order to maintain its West Indian colonies and its navy. “The growth of Upper Canada was a significant step toward freeing the British empire from the effects of American economic restrictions.” (41) Canada, as an alternative source of nearly everything supplied by the U.S., had to be neutralized. Ironically, an American diplomat in the West Indies in 1827-8 reported, “the inhabitants of this island [Barbados] as well as the others, have less regard for Mr. Jefferson than any of our Presidents (not excepting Mr. Madison...yet they say he nevertheless, though not intentionally, rendered them a great service by laying on the Embargo, which taught them to find resources within themselves, that is to say, by cultivating ground provisions, which they never did before, and were entirely dependent on the United States.” (quoting Robert Monroe Harrison to Henry Clay, 516)
Interestingly, “the growth of Canada was also stimulated by, and in turn contributed to, the growth of the United States...and the settlers in this northeastern region were as likely to cross into Canada in search of new prosperity as they were to remain in the United States.” (refs Lambert, Travels through Lower Canada and the United States, 1813, 244-55, 40) There’s a story here...
Another interesting point, that Stagg mentions several times but doesn’t develop, is the government’s apparent difficulty raising troops. In spite of the fact that “the society of the early Republic greatly esteemed the virtuous citizen who willingly assumed public duties in a selfless, disinterested manner, recruiting in the northeast and northwest was hampered by men’s loyalty to their regions (and regional militia) in preference to national army service. (195) Troop levies in the northwest were “hampered by a series of petty obstructions, usually arising from attempts to use writs of habeus corpus to get men discharged on a variety of grounds, mainly wrongful enlistment.” (172) This is another story, especially in light of the government’s claims that one of the “popular” reasons for war was British impressment of American seamen.
A final dramatic moment (amidst several hundred pages of really dry political history) comes on January 5 1815, when the Hartford convention convened to discuss possible New England secession. An observer warned Monroe that they “would have to be crushed immediately. If the rebellious New England states were given time to organize an effective government, he believed they could, by virtue of their large populations and well-equipped militias, successfully ‘bid defiance’ to the Union, seize all the property of the federal government, and perhaps enter into an alliance with Britain. Monroe took the advice to heart. He increased the guard on the Springfield armory and on January 10 authorized New York Republican leaders...to draw on more money and volunteers to crush a rebellion or an invasion.” (481-2) Another story here, about regional interests, force, and national union.
This is an interesting period, and it seems there are several interesting stories waiting to be told about it. Something to keep in mind....
Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830
1983
Stagg admits that the dominant feature of almost all literature” on the War of 1812 “has been its emphasis on the sheer ineptitude of the American war effort.” But even so, “to stress ineptitude as the theme of the War of 1812...is to neglect an important, albeit obvious, point about its history--which is that no administration could have actually intended what happened to have occurred.” (x) The question is, was there a realistic plan behind Madison’s policy, or was he too a source of incompetence? “The incompetence that seemed all-pervasive during the war years was more than simply the failings of so many individuals; rather it was symptomatic of political and administrative problems deeply rooted in the government of American society. Yet the founding fathers, including Madison himself, had justified the introduction of a new constitution in 1789 very much on the grounds that it would provide the United States with a more efficient system of government and prevent a recurrence of the disorder that had characterized the War for Independence.” (xi) This is an interesting point, because it suggests that the founders were particularly concerned about facilitating a united military, in expectation of future wars with Britain. And because it suggests a lack of concern with what the American people actually wanted, both in the minds of the founders and of Professor Stagg.
At the end of his introduction, Stagg also seems to admit that the war didn’t really resolve anything. Nor did “the sudden rise of Anglo-American ‘friendship’ after 1815.” (xii) The real change in British-American relations was brought about by neither Britons nor Americans, but by a change in the global balance of power created by “the emancipation of Latin America.” So in that sense, a study of politics and American foreign policy through 1830 that doesn’t say another word about Spanish American independence, seems fatally myopic.
Madison’s decision for war is hard to see as sensible. When it declared war on Great Britain, the U.S. “could command little more than six thousand regular troops and a naval force consisting of sixteen vessels of all sizes.” In contrast, the British controlled the seas with “six hundred vessels in active service while also supporting a regular army at home and abroad that totaled nearly one quarter of a million men.” (3) Stagg says Madison believed America could easily take a large part of Canada, and that this would bring Britain to the negotiating table. But in 1812 his Jeffersonian political allies seem to have been on the same page: “The best-known statement of American optimism about the ease of seizing Canada was Thomas Jefferson’s claim that ‘the acquisition of Canada...as far as the neighborhood of Quebec will be a mere matter of marching.’” (note 8, 5) The critical issue was denying Britain access to raw materials it needed in order to maintain its West Indian colonies and its navy. “The growth of Upper Canada was a significant step toward freeing the British empire from the effects of American economic restrictions.” (41) Canada, as an alternative source of nearly everything supplied by the U.S., had to be neutralized. Ironically, an American diplomat in the West Indies in 1827-8 reported, “the inhabitants of this island [Barbados] as well as the others, have less regard for Mr. Jefferson than any of our Presidents (not excepting Mr. Madison...yet they say he nevertheless, though not intentionally, rendered them a great service by laying on the Embargo, which taught them to find resources within themselves, that is to say, by cultivating ground provisions, which they never did before, and were entirely dependent on the United States.” (quoting Robert Monroe Harrison to Henry Clay, 516)
Interestingly, “the growth of Canada was also stimulated by, and in turn contributed to, the growth of the United States...and the settlers in this northeastern region were as likely to cross into Canada in search of new prosperity as they were to remain in the United States.” (refs Lambert, Travels through Lower Canada and the United States, 1813, 244-55, 40) There’s a story here...
Another interesting point, that Stagg mentions several times but doesn’t develop, is the government’s apparent difficulty raising troops. In spite of the fact that “the society of the early Republic greatly esteemed the virtuous citizen who willingly assumed public duties in a selfless, disinterested manner, recruiting in the northeast and northwest was hampered by men’s loyalty to their regions (and regional militia) in preference to national army service. (195) Troop levies in the northwest were “hampered by a series of petty obstructions, usually arising from attempts to use writs of habeus corpus to get men discharged on a variety of grounds, mainly wrongful enlistment.” (172) This is another story, especially in light of the government’s claims that one of the “popular” reasons for war was British impressment of American seamen.
A final dramatic moment (amidst several hundred pages of really dry political history) comes on January 5 1815, when the Hartford convention convened to discuss possible New England secession. An observer warned Monroe that they “would have to be crushed immediately. If the rebellious New England states were given time to organize an effective government, he believed they could, by virtue of their large populations and well-equipped militias, successfully ‘bid defiance’ to the Union, seize all the property of the federal government, and perhaps enter into an alliance with Britain. Monroe took the advice to heart. He increased the guard on the Springfield armory and on January 10 authorized New York Republican leaders...to draw on more money and volunteers to crush a rebellion or an invasion.” (481-2) Another story here, about regional interests, force, and national union.
This is an interesting period, and it seems there are several interesting stories waiting to be told about it. Something to keep in mind....
